The foreign policies convergence as a factor of the establishment of the Pacific alliance by Guerra-Baron, Angelica
www.ssoar.info
The foreign policies convergence as a factor of the
establishment of the Pacific alliance
Guerra-Baron, Angelica
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Guerra-Baron, A. (2019). The foreign policies convergence as a factor of the establishment of the Pacific alliance.
Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review, 19(2), 187-213. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-
ssoar-63165-8
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/1.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/1.0
 The Foreign Policies Convergence as a Factor 
of the Establishment of the Pacific Alliance 
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Abstract 
This article explains the possible drivers behind the establishment of the Pacific Alliance (PA) in South 
America focusing on foreign economic policies and explaining the extent of policy convergence as a 
possible factor. In so doing, it examines on what basis these countries try to engage collectively with key 
Asian partners. A brief historical explanation might allow us to verify how non-legal elements have been 
politically and successfully networked with perfect timing. Policy convergence over strategies such us 
internationalization and negotiation was a milestone in the creation of the PA itself, presidentially led by 
Chile, Colombia and Peru. However, Chile and Peru share a pro-Pacific profile in economic and political 
terms, while Colombia’s elites have traditionally ignored the Pacific Coast. These differences not 
necessarily impede on the articulation of a collective cooperation strategy with Asia-Pacific, but it might 
slow down the Chilean eagerness to reach prompt accords with Asian partners. This article suggests that 
taking non-legal factors into consideration might allow a wider understanding of the reasons behind 
economic alliances’ formation. In so doing, International Political Economy’ theoretical richness might fill 
the gap that International Economy Law has to explain such phenomena. 
 
Keywords: Pacific Alliance, South America, Asia-Pacific, China, policy convergence, 
internationalization strategies. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The South American regionalization process, thus far, might be categorised as a 
series of frustrated attempts to reach and implement agreements. The Andean Group 
was set up in 1969 – by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru – with the aim of 
establishing a common market under a supranational scheme; however it currently 
works as an imperfect custom union. The Southern Common Market (Mercosur in 
Spanish), meanwhile, was set up in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
Mercosur adopted an inter-governmental mechanism to reach agreements. Despite 
this group being considered the most successful integration scheme in the region,
1
 it 
                                               
*  Angélica Guerra-Barón is a Co-researcherat the Group of International and Regional Orders. PhD 
candidate in Political Science and Government. Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP) 
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1  Andrés Malamud, “Mercosur Turns 15: Between Rising Rhetoric and Declining 
Achievement,” in Cambridge Review of International Affairs 18, no. 3 (2005): 421–36. 
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has not been able to perform as a common market – yet it is still working on developing 
a supranational model. 
For the very first time, in 2008, all South American states
 
joined in the Union 
of South American Nations (UNASUR in Spanish), a political bloc whose main 
objective is to strengthen political dialogue between its members in order to reinforce 
integration through policy coordination between the Andean Community (AC) and 
Mercosur. Thus, UNASUR’s novelty lies in its core mission of facilitating intra-blocs 
convergence strictly on political terms. However, it has not been able to materialise thus 
far,
2
 due to the ideological divergences between insiders;
3
 furthermore, specific projects 
such as integration in infrastructure and energy cooperation has not been achieved.
4
  
In 2010, the Peruvian President Alan Garcia (2006–2010) led the creation of 
the Pacific Alliance (PA) through a secrete invitation to Chile, Colombia and Ecuador 
with the aim of creating a group of South American states whose foreign economic 
policies reflect pragmatism and openness shown in its net of trade agreements; therefore 
facilitating and enhancing trade accords convergence. It does not suggest that the PA’s 
main objective consists of creating a foreign investment promotion platform, but it 
supports the fact that Chile, Colombia and Peru have previously met (2007-2010) at the 
failed Latin American Pacific Basin Forum (ARCO in Spanish).
5
  
The PA seems to be opposed to other South American regionalism schemes, 
therefore its creation should be interpreted within a South American political context 
characterised by the questioning of neoliberalism. First, Mercosur a politically driven 
bloc led mainly by Argentina (Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner’s 
regime: 2003–2015) and Brazil (Ignacio Lula Da Silva: 2003–2011) and then later 
joined by Venezuela as a full member state (2012) – thus representing the “leftist 
political activism”6 bloc in South America. Second, the Bolivarian Alliance of 
The Americas–Trade Agreements of The People (ALBA-TCP in Spanish), an 
anti-neoliberal bloc devoid of United States influence and led by Venezuela that 
plays an “anti-globalization”7 role within the region. Finally, the Andean 
                                               
2  Amado Cervo and Antônio C. Lessa, “An Assessment of the Lula Era (Editorial),” in 
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 53, no. SPE (2010): 5–6. 
3  Gian Luca Gardini and Peter Lambert, “Introduction: Ideology and Pragmatism in Latin 
American Foreign Policy,” in Latin American Foreign Policies: Between Ideology and 
Pragmatism, ed. Gian Luca Gardini and Peter Lambert (New York: Palgrave, 2011), 1–12. 
4  According with Babjee Pothuraju, “UNASUR and Security in South America,” Institute 
for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 2012, accesed  June 12, 2017, 
http://www.idsa.in/backgrounder/UNASURandSecurityinSouthAmerica. 
5  ARCO consists on an intergovernmental forum that meet all Latin American countries 
bordered by the Pacific Ocean (Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Salvador). It was established in 2007 and 
lasted up to 2010 when Chile, Colombia and Mexico accepted the Peruvian government 
invitation to create the PA. 
6  Malamud, “Mercosur Turns 15,” 425. 
7  Patrick Heller, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Richard Snyder, “Dependency and 
Development in a Globalized World: Looking Back and Forward,” in Studies in 
Comparative International Development 44, no. 4 (2009): 287–95. 
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Community (AC), formerly Andean Group,
8
 whose members follow two 
opposing approaches. While Colombia, at a lesser extent, and Peru 
acknowledge the importance of following GATT/WTO rules, Bolivia and 
Ecuador reject the US’ presence in both foreign and economic policies and are 
thus more aligned to ALBA-TCP. Taking into account the South American 
context, this paper focuses on the PA. Once the idea of building an alliance 
became concrete in 2011, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru aimed to 
collectively engage through policy coordination and cooperation. To that end, 
policy convergence allows Bogota, Lima and Santiago de Chile (capital cities of 
Colombia, Peru and Chile, respectively) to acknowledge each other as like-
minded partners, which enables them to subscribe to their commitment to 
liberal values, democracy as an ideal government regime, neo-liberalism as an 
economic model to follow, and full compliance with the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) rules and international investment standards. Thus, the 
PA emerges when President Hugo Chavez (1998-2013) enacted an anti-
globalization role that has a spill-over effect on two key regional schemes in 
South America (Mercosur and Unasur); while Mexico keeps aligned to the US 
during Obama’s administrations. Meanwhile, UNASUR’s existence is currently 
at stake, so the Colombian government is proposing a new group (Parlasur).
9
 
This contribution investigates what lies behind both domestic agendas 
and international agreements? Certainly, there are not only economic and legal 
reasons for these – key political interests are also translated into timely 
strategies and institutional structures, as well as into ideas by which to support 
these goals. What factors best explain the decision of states (actors/agents) to 
play certain roles regionally? Is it the international scenario? Or, is it possible 
that a more domestic approach allows us to shed light on these inquiries? And, 
last but not least, which input drives the PA’s performance: is it economics, is it 
politics, or is it both?  
This article argues that the PA is a presidential project based on foreign 
economic policy convergence of its South American members (Chile, Colombia 
and Peru) expressed in an intra-regional network of international investment 
agreements (IIAs).
10
 To develop this argument, the article adopts an inter-
                                               
8  Without Chile (1976) and Venezuela (2006). 
9  UNASUR’s ideological basis promoted by Venezuela (Hugo Chávez, 1999-2013), once 
followed unquestionable by Bolivia and Ecuador, has currently no floor. Antidemocratic 
practices and economic and political chaos spread throughout the Venezuelan territory 
pushed some countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and 
Uruguay) to quit UNASUR as a protest against Caracas’ decisions. South American 
presidents play back and forth with ideas of integration though different groups. This 
explains that the Colombian government, with the support of Chile, suggests a new 
scheme, named Parlasur that safeguards democracy and promotes cooperation in South 
America. 
10  IIAs include free trade agreements (FTAs), with a specific chapter that deals with foreign 
(both direct and indirect) investment and its handling. IIAs equally include those bilateral 
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disciplinary theoretical framework that links the empirical richness that 
international law and economics has with the theoretical richness that 
international political economy offers, adding key historical junctures and 
internationalization strategies of foreign economic policies of said countries 
aimed towards Asia.  
Most of the literature of international law and economics explains legal 
provisions on specific sectors
11
 and the politics of law making in international 
trade, investment and dispute settlement
12
 on a global scale,
13
 but less attention 
goes to the politics behind assembling regional groups. Likewise, some efforts 
wonder about policy convergence as an input and/or output for further 
negotiations.
14
 However, generally speaking, international law and economics 
has not been able to cope with a theoretical approach that helps to explain 
neither the role that policy convergence plays in sub-regional settings or the 
importance of non-legal reasoning behind such phenomena. It seems that some 
international law and economics scholars tacitly agree on policy convergence as 
a non-political spectrum.
15
 In spite of that, non-legal key elements might explain 
why some governments eventually decide to engage in collective understandings.  
                                                                                                                   
treaties that only deal with the promotion and protection of foreign (direct and indirect) 
investment. Such agreements are called bilateral investment treaties (BITs). 
11  Rohan Kariyawasam, “International Telecommunications,” in Research Handbook in 
International Economic Law, ed. Andrew T. Gusman and Alan O. Sykes (Cheltenham and 
Northampton: Edward Elgar Publising, 2007), 533–74. See also Scott Hal S., 
“International Finance: Rule Choices for Global Financial Markets,” in Research 
Handbook in International Economic Law, ed. Andrew T. Gusman and Alan O. Sykes, 
361–417.  
12  It is well exemplified in Dimascio and Pauwelyn’s work. Nicholas Dimascio and Joost 
Pauwelyn, “Non Discrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two 
Sides of the Same Coin?”, in The American Journal of International Law 102, no. 1 
(2008): 48–89. It is also the case of Alan O. Sykes, “The Economics of ‘Injury’ in 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases,” in Economic Dimensions in International 
Law: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives, ed. Jagdeep S. Bhandari and Alan O. 
Sykes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 83–125. See also: Alan O. Sykes. 
“Trade Remedy Laws” (Chicago: Olin Law & Economics Working Paper, 2005). 
13  Lauge Skovgaard, “The Politics of South-South Bilateral Investment Treaties,” in The 
Politics of International Economic Law, ed. Tomer Brounde, Marc L. Busch, and Amelia 
Porges (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 186–210. 
14  For example: Reeve T. Bull, Neysun A Mahboubi, Richard B Stewart, and Jonathan B 
Wiener, “New Approaches to International Regulatory Cooperation: The Challenge of 
TTIP, TPP, and Mega-Regional Trade Agreements,” in Law and Contemporary Problems 
78, no. 1 (2015): 1–29. 
15  For example: Tomer Broude, Marc L. Busch, and Amelia Porges, “Introduction: Some 
Observations on the Politics of International Economic Law,” in The Politics of 
International Economic Law, ed. Tomer Brounde, Marc L. Busch, and Amelia Porges 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1–18. See also: Arie Reich, “Threat of 
Politicization of the WTO,” in Journal of International Law 26, no. 4 (2005): 779–814. 
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On the other hand, international political economy helps to fill this gap 
in the sense that it offers different approaches to understand why public actors 
adopt some decisions and, in so doing, whether structural, domestic or cognitive 
explanations offer a better understanding of empirical facts.
16
 Nevertheless, it 
should be taken into account that international law and economics offers 
specificity and empirical grounds to theoretical explanations searched for in 
other disciplines.  
Incorporating domestic and ideational pieces into the analysis
17
 
increases the possibility of unravelling key explicative elements. Therefore, I 
suggest an inside-out understanding within international political economy that 
helps to round out the dynamics playing out between international settings 
(structure) and states. Furthermore, international political economy theoretical 
insights allow to grasp the political elements that lie behind decisions 
presidentially driven. For so doing, I suggest focussing on domestic elements; 
such as the role that presidents play when seeking to explain how these actors 
announce to take advantage of policy convergence already identified, as well as, 
correlations between different actors and mechanisms.  
In order to do so, this article focuses on foreign economic policy (FEP), 
understood as an “assemblage of official decisions and plans employed by a 
state to interact with the international economic environment in order to meet 
the demands of domestic economic development as perceived by the ruling 
class or group.”18 With the aim of understanding FEP convergence, this paper 
takes briefly into account key historical junctures of Chile (in the 1960s) and 
Colombia and Peru (in the 1980s); as well as their investment negotiations, 
strategies and outputs.  
This article is structured into four sections. The first section presents a 
theoretical inter-disciplinary framework wherein international law and 
economics interpretations regarding policy convergence literature and 
international political economy analysis are introduced. Following on, the 
second section focuses on empirically establishing the occurrence of policy 
convergence in internationalization and investment strategies between Bogota, 
Lima and Santiago – linking it with key drivers, such as historical junctures and 
presidentially driven foreign policies. The third section then sheds light on the 
centrality of political input to explain the PA’s approach to Asia-Pacific, being 
                                               
16  Benjamin Cohen, “The Political Economy of International Trade,” in International 
Organization 44, no. 2 (1990): 267. 
17  In this sense, see: John Ravenhill, “International Political Economy,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of International Relations, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncal Snidal (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 551. 
18  Philip Nel and Matthew Stephen, “The Foreign Economic Policies of Regional Powers in 
the Developing World,” in Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests 
and Strategies of Regional Powers, ed. Daniel Flemes (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 
2010), 72. 
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based on an inter-governmental cooperative and mandatory scheme. The fourth 
section summarises the preliminary insights.  
 
 
International Economic Law and International Political 
Economy Approaches to Explaining Policy Convergence 
 
International political economy  literature defines policy convergence as 
“the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of increasing 
similarity in structures, processes, and performances.”19 I suggest that policy 
convergence can play distinct roles in alliances’ formation – as a departure point 
(input) thereto or as an output thereof, or indeed both. Policy convergence can 
also facilitate further commitments being made between states through different 
mechanisms of understanding – cooperation and coordination. In such cases 
policy convergence functions as an input. On the other hand, policy 
convergence might also be either an intentional or unintentional outcome of 
proceedings. In the first case, decision makers look forward to coordinating 
policies or regulations; yet it is also possible that even without any coordination 
agents can still share similar policies.
20
 Whether intended or not, policy 
convergence has been scarcely studied by international economic law; 
regulatory convergence in very specific disciplines has, meanwhile, drawn more 
attention. International political economy offers a theoretical framework that is 
particularly useful for understanding the dynamics underpinning alliances’ 
formation and policy convergence. 
 
 
Policy convergence from an international economic law perspective 
 
Regarding policy convergence and the politics behind it, some scholars explore to 
what extent political elements might drive policy convergence as an input, the 
policymaking process itself and subsequent implementation – despite they have taken 
pride in its de-politicization.
21
 Most of international economic law scholars’ interest 
focuses on the politics of law making in international trade, investment and dispute 
settlement, but less attention goes to the politics behind the preferential trade 
                                               
19  Clark Kerr, The Future of Industrial Societies: Convergence or Continuing Diversity? 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 3. 
20  For example, emerging economies such as Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey 
and South Africa; known as CIVETS. 
21  Broude et al., “Introduction: Some Observations,” 1; Reich, “Threat of Politicization of 
the WTO,” 779. 
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agreements (PTAs) and regional trade agreements (RTAs)
22
 concluded between 
developing countries of the Global South. This equally applies to the making of new 
regionalism schemes, or to the fact that the number of international investment 
agreements worldwide continues to grow.
23
 In this case, for example, some Latin 
American emerging economies
24
 keep playing active roles as host states, even when 
the decision to perform as such and to engage in new forms of alliances is linked to 
political drivers. This is the case of Brazil (despite its political crisis: US$ 64.6 
billion), Mexico (US$ 30.3 billion), Chile (US$ 20.2 billion), Colombia (US$ 12.1 
billion) and Argentina (US$ 11.7 billion).  
Other international economic law scholars’ wonder about the political 
reasoning behind governments signing RTAs and bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs), but their explanations are constrained to only the scope of each kind of 
agreement (market access for FTAs and non-discrimination for BITs) or to the 
remedies that are available in case of breach (compliance/compensation).
25
 
Some researchers focus on the political dimensions behind trade remedies
26
 and 
the impossibility to differentiate between technocratic reasons vis-à-vis political 
factors, as well as the pressure faced in specific case studies.
27
 Adopting a more 
combative line of reasoning, some scholars highlights the need for classical 
economic theory to isolate international trade issues from politics – but also the 
impossibility of doing so due to globalization, the higher interdependency of 
states
28
 and the nature of power. Within such a milieu, smaller states adjust their 
                                               
22  Here RTAs include FTAs and custom unions (CUs). I personally keep in line with the 
GATT/WTO narrative – according to which, these agreements can be reached regardless 
of physical geographic proximity.  
23  In 2017 eighteen new IIAs were concluded, bringing the total number of agreements to 
3,322. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2018. Investment and New Industrial Policies 
(Geneva: United Nations Publications, 2018), accessed May 9, 2019, 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2018_en.pdf. 
24  Emerging economies characterized by rapid economic growth; domestic policies 
favouring economic liberalization; and, adoption of a free-market system. Arnold and 
Quelch 1998 cited by Robert E. Hoskisson, Lorraine Eden, Chung M. Lau, and Mike 
Wright, “Strategy in Emerging Economies,” in The Academy of Management Journal 43, 
no. 3 (2000): 249–67. 
25  Dimascio and Pauwelyn, “Non Discrimination in Trade and Investment,” 48. 
26  This is the case of Alan O. Sykes: “The Economics of ‘Injury’,” 83 and “Trade Remedy 
Laws”. 
27  Angélica Guerra-Barón, “Medidas de Salvaguardia : ¿Defensa o Protección Comercial? 
Un Análisis Jurídico a la Luz del Caso de la República Popular China con el Perú en 
Materia de Textiles,” in Agenda Internacional 26 (2008): 199–230. Also: Angélica 
Guerra-Barón, “La Aplicación de Medidas de Salvaguardia: Un Instrumento de Defensa 
Comercial con Profundas Implicaciones Jurídicas desde la Perspectiva del Derecho 
Internacional Económico: La Experiencia de China y Perú,” in  Colección Enrique Low 
Murtra VII (2010): 75–184. 
28  Candido García, “Establishing the Rules of the Game: Domestic Structures and Unfair 
Trade Instruments,” in Regional and Global Regulation of International Trade, ed. 
Francis Synder (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2002),  97–130. This author brings in here the 
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policies and domestic regulations to the demands of larger countries so as to be 
able to enter the market.
29
 
Policy convergence as an input that facilitates further negotiations over rules 
has been expressly acknowledged by some researchers.
30
 Likewise such phenomena 
has been empirically tested as an outcome in specific domains.
31
 A recent eclectic form 
of reasoning, meanwhile, has incorporated convergence as both an input and an output. 
For example, international regulatory cooperation among mega-trade agreements (such 
as TPP) is politically led by the former US administration (of Barack Obama) through 
institutional structures (in the legal sense) and techniques.
32
 Therefore, it is shown that 
the US uses its own standards to create a de facto global standard.  
Following that reasoning, some international law and economics 
scholars wonder if the popularity of South–South BITs imply a sort of 
convergence between the norms of developing countries and the norms of the 
developed world (EU, US).
33
  In so doing, Skovgaard argues for the need to 
investigate eventual differences in investment rule making. Despite he does not 
focus on rule making per se but rather on the output thereof, he recommends 
further research on the ideas and strategies of key actors involved in investment 
treaty rule making.
34
 
From a broader and general perspective, Jeswald Salacuse wonders 
about the significance of the increasing number of IIAs worldwide over the last 
six decades and the eventuality of referring to an international investment 
regime. In so doing, he borrows from International Relations (IR) literature the 
concept of “regime” to develop his argument and embraces, without referring 
explicitly to it in his paper, the interpretation of regime first made by one of the 
founders of the American version of international political economy.
35
 
According to Keohane, the concept of international regime is a complex one 
because its components (principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures) affect states’ behaviour. Following Keohane’s concept of 
international regime, Salacuse thus concludes that the significant number of 
                                                                                                                   
works of International Relations scholars such as Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, 
“Introduction” in Governance in a Globalizing World, ed. Joseph Nye and John Donahue 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 1–41. 
29  This is called “reverse convergence”. See: García, “Establishing the Rules,” 107. 
30  Such as Stephen Woolcock, “Making Multi-Level Rules Work: Trade and Investment 
Rules in Regional and Bilateral Agreements,” in Regionalism and Bilateralism in Trade 
and Investment, ed. Philippe De Lombaerde (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 37–58. 
31  Such as those of telecommunications and finance. See Kariyawasam, “International 
Telecommunications,” 533; Hal, “International Finance,” 361. 
32  Bull et al., “New Approaches,” 1. 
33  Particularly on investment treatment and protection standards Skovgaard, “The Politics of 
South-South,” 186. 
34  Additionally, he reaches the conclusion that South–South BITs are “typically less 
comprehensive in scope” than North–South ones are. See Skovgaard, “The Politics of 
South-South,”186. 
35  Keohane and Nye, “Introduction,” 1. 
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BITs “would seem [to be] an international regime […] of investment [with] 
significant differences from other international regimes.”36  
So far, it is an established fact that political issues lie behind the increasing 
number of IIAs, but international law and economics scholars have scarcely 
acknowledged this. Likewise, such interconnections have been poorly considered when 
exploring regionalism schemes from a broader perspective. As Baldwin  states, “the key 
issues surrounding RTAs […] turn on political issues, not economic ones, but the 
politics is driven by economic effects.”37 Furthermore, twenty-first century trade 
dynamics currently respond to the de-localization of factories through deep RTAs, a 
matrix of BITs, and to massive unilateral tariff-cutting by developing nations (Baldwin 
2014). In that sense, Baldwin sees twenty-first century regionalism as a politically – and 
thus not only economically – driven answer to global trade gaps. However, policy and 
regulatory convergence from an international law and economics scholarship 
perspective are still unresponsive to explain the drivers that facilitate policy 
convergence; as such, the proposal to explain the PA here is indeed worthwhile. 
 
 
International political economy approaches to explaining 
agents’ decisions and policy convergence 
 
What lies behind both domestic agendas and international agreements? 
Certainly, there are not only economic and legal reasons for these – key political 
interests are also translated into timely strategies and institutional structures, as 
well as into ideas by which to support these goals. What factors best explain the 
decision of states (actors/agents) to play certain roles in the global economic 
arena? Is it the international scenario? Or, is it possible that a more domestic 
approach allows us to shed light on the drivers that lead emerging economies’ 
policies in a given direction? And, last but not least, which input drives the 
PA’s performance: is it economics, is it politics, or is it both? 
To address these questions, international political economy offers 
theoretical tools to examine how a state interacts through its foreign economic 
policy (FEP) and “the issue of what it is that fundamentally motivates states in 
their international economic relations.”38 That approach aims to analyse “the 
                                               
36  Jeswald W. Salacuse, “The Emerging Global Regime for Investment,” in Harvard 
International Law Journal 51, no. 2 (2010): 463. 
37  Richard Baldwin “Preferential Trade Agreements,” in The Oxford Handbook of the World 
Trade Organization, ed. Amrita Narlikar, Martin Daunton, and Stern Robert (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 632. 
38  Cohen, “The Political Economy of International Trade,” 267.  
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interplay of economics and politics in the world arena”39 and the “interactions 
among governments and markets across countries.”40  
International political economy uses different lenses to focus on and 
grasp those interactions. Cohen’s work  shows scholars’ preference for 
emphasizing structural level explanations (outside-in) rather than domestic 
(inside-out) and cognitive factors to explain a state’s decision.41 In so doing, 
some take into account the centrality of the state as the main player in the 
international economic system – but also the influence of private interests in the 
state’s foreign policy vis-à-vis economic issues.42 The growing interdependence 
between economies and the presence of both state and non-state actors when 
determining economic outcomes led to the term “complex interdependence” to 
be coined.
43
 From another perspective, some international political economy scholars 
include ideas and beliefs
44
 within trade studies as a reaction to the need for identifying 
“the role of political ideas or ideologies […] in complex interaction.”45 
                                               
39  Jeffry Frieden and D. Lake, International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global 
Power and Wealth (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000), 1. 
40  Abdelal, Rawi, “Constructivism as an Approach to International Political Economy,” in 
Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy, ed. Mark Blyth (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2009), 62. 
41  For example, Cohen, “The Political Economy” as well as Benjamin Cohen, International 
Political Economy: An Intellectual History (New Jersey: Princeton University, 1990);  
Benjamin Cohen, “The Multiple Traditions of American IPE,” in Routledge Handbook of 
International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a Global Conversation, ed. Mark Blyth 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 23–35. Even though IR scholars do include ideas to explain 
“the role of belief systems and perceptions in foreign policy decision-making”, as was the 
case with Snyder, Bruck and Sapin in 1954. In this sense, Alexander Wendt, Social 
Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Thus an 
intense and escalating debate exists among mainstream IR theories (realism, neorealism, 
neoliberal institutionalism, Marxism) over what drives (and thus explains) states’ conduct 
within the international economic environment. For explanations regarding politics, see: 
Robert Gilpin, War & Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1981); Robert Gilpin, The Challenge Af Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 
21st Century (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000); Robert Gilpin, Global 
Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2001). Topics such as private interests, transnational 
enterprises and international regimes, see: Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and 
Stephen D. Krasner, “International Organization and the Study of World Politics,” in 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 645–85. The role that politics may play in 
the global economy, see Frieden and Lake, “International Political Economy,” 1. See also 
Jeffry Frieden, “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World 
of Global Finance,” in International Organization 45, no. 4 (1991): 425–51.   
42  Peter J. Katzenstein, “International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic 
Policies of Advanced Industrial States,” in International Organization 30, no. 1 (1976): 1-45. 
43  Keohane and Nye, “Introduction,” 12. 
44  Judith L. Goldstein, “Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy,” in International 
Organization 42, no. 1 (1988): 179–217. See also: John S. Odell, “Understanding 
International Trade Policies: An Emerging Synthesis,” in World Politics 43, no. 1 (1990): 
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In the 1990s, the theoretical debate moved towards international 
political economy theories versus cognitive analysis. This meant that agents’ 
decisions could not only be rationalised by analysing power and “interests 
expressed in terms of material preferences and goals”,46 but that it was also 
possible to include ideas and consensual knowledge as potential explanations. 
This cognitive approach is known as constructivism, and it first came into IR 
literature through a few seminal works.
47
  
The role of ideas in building institutions has been acknowledged as a 
variable of analysis
48
  that can be tackled at three levels; domestic, bilateral, and 
multilateral. At the multilateral one, the incidence of global political-economic 
structures
49
 might explain the ways in which liberal ideas are reproduced 
through transnational policy networks. This perspective, however, overlooks the 
domestic drivers that (also) foster states’ decisions.50  
More recent  international political economy literature has called for the 
inclusion of the “missing middle: when and how ideas and norms matter” to 
explain government’s decisions within sub-regional economic scenarios.51 This 
inside-out approach helps to clarify the understanding of norms and economic 
ideas without omitting systemic factors (international commitments), instead 
putting emphasis on cognitive aspects. The influence of domestic ideas and 
                                                                                                                   
139–67. Additionally, Rohrlich’s work: Paul Egon Rohrlich, “Economic Culture and 
Foreign Policy: The Cognitive Analysis of Economic Policy Making,” in International 
Organization 41, no. 1 (1987): 61-92. 
45  John Ikenberry, “Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Economic 
Policy,” in International Organization 42, no. 1 (1988): 242. 
46  Cohen, “The Multiple Traditions,” 32. 
47  Wendt, Social Theory, 429. From an international law and IR perspective, see: Nicholas 
G. Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International 
Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). See also: Michael 
Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Power of Liberal International Organizations,” in 
Power in Global Governance, ed. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 161–84. 
48  Goldstein, “Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy,” 242. 
49  Odell, “Understanding International,” 139. 
50  Goldstein, “Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy,” 179. Authors such as Odell 
sheds light on inside-out analysis, using cognitive approaches to explain why states 
engage in RTAs (as we do here). Odell, “Understanding International,” 139. This enriches 
as well theoretical and empirical case studies related to trade, which have been poorly 
explored thus far – as Odell acknowledges. Furthermore, an inside-out analysis, benefits 
research on policy and regulatory convergence. In this sense, see: Daniel W. Drezner, 
“Policy Convergence,” in International Studies 3, no. 1 (2001): 53–78. See also:  Daniel 
W. Drezner, All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes 
(Princeton and Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
51  Ravenhill, “International Political Economy,” 551.  
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interests
52
 and of “social identities, norms, and other collectively shared ideas 
and beliefs”53 is thus making its way into current international political 
economy research. 
Despite the theoretical trends in international political economy already 
described, scholars still recur to systemic or structural explanations when 
analysing policy and regulatory convergence. Mainstream scholars follow the 
logic of international institutions (structural lens) when exploring why 
“different national policies are homogenised into one global policy.”54 This is 
also true for seminal studies in Political Science.
55
 
 
 
Key Drivers of Policy Convergence and Strategies of Chile, 
Colombia and Peru 
 
Emerging economies focus on compliance with trade and investment 
objectives on two levels. At the domestic one, these economies design policies 
and strategies in order to make their geographical territories attractive to the 
transnational business community. To this end, states promote regulatory 
compliance with international trade standards and principles established by 
GATT/WTO (no discrimination, transparency, predictability), alongside 
continuously revising and improving the investment climate. In the process, 
states demand technical assistance on investment issues from the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
At the international level, emerging economies mould their foreign 
policies- or own isolated strategies to interact in bilateral and multilateral 
scenarios - specifically through the recognition of WTO principles in the form 
of FTAs and BITs. As such, they contribute to the enlargement of the already 
complex network of international investment treaties.
56
 Furthermore, host and 
home states are compelled to comply with the rules of the game already set. 
Following a similar trend to international political economy’s theoretical 
explanations, policy convergence is tackled through different lenses too. 
                                               
52  Stefan Schirm, “Ideas and Interests in Global Financial Governance: Comparing German 
and US Preference Formation,” in Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22, no. 3 
(2009): 501–521. 
53  Abdelal, “Constructivism as an Approach,” 63. 
54  Cohen, “International Political Economy,” 57. 
55  These studies contemplate the causes of policy convergence, focusing on the international 
setting mainly. For example, Colin J. Bennett, “Review Article: What Is Policy 
Convergence and What Causes It ?,” in British Journal of Political Science 21, no. 2 
(1991): 215–33. See also: Katharina Holzinger and Christoph Knill, “Causes and 
Conditions of Cross-National Policy Convergence,” in Journal of European Public Policy 
12, no. 5 (2005): 775–96.  
56  Salacuse, “The Emerging Global Regime,” 427. 
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Systemic reasoning that focuses on the pressure exerted by the international 
system; a domestic approach that focuses on the way internal factors facilitate 
such convergence; and, cognitive reasoning that consider leaders’ ideas and 
backgrounds as possible explanations for their chosen behaviour. 
I argue that emphasizing domestic explanations rather than structural 
level ones helps to round out the dynamics playing out between international 
settings (structure) and states (through its leaders). For a better understanding, I 
suggest the exploration of domestic policies presidentially driven, when seeking 
to explain how to take advantage of policy convergence already identified, as 
well as, correlations between different actors and mechanisms.  
This article adopts the concept of foreign economic policy (FEP), an 
“assemblage of official decisions and plans employed by a state to interact with 
the international economic environment in order to meet the demands of 
domestic economic development as perceived by the ruling class or group.”57 
Thus, FEP convergence shall be explained by taking briefly into account key 
historical junctures of Chile (in the 1960s) and Colombia and Peru (in the 
1980s); as well as their investment negotiations, strategies and outputs of those 
emerging economies.  
Broadly speaking Colombia and Peru have traditionally participated as 
full members of sub-regional schemes,
58
 while Chile has privileged an extra-
regional and bilateral approach. Bogota seeks to align its foreign policy to that 
of the US in a straight way. Lima also aims to align to Washington while 
diversifying its political and trade agenda with Asian partners. Chile, however, 
has intended to forge a foreign policy of its own; one that does not trouble its 
political and trade relations with the EU and the US but also one that allows the 
country to become a bridge country for Asian companies interested in entering 
the South American market as well as for South American companies aiming to 
enter the Asian market. Chile’s role as a trans-Pacific state between two 
continents is a long-term domestic project with regional political and trade 
effects.  From a comparative perspective, Colombian and Peruvian foreign 
economic policies might be better understood by taking into consideration the 
cost of dealing with the 1980s debt crisis.  
During the 1980s debt crisis, Bogota and then Lima promoted positive 
political relations with the international financial institutions (IFI) and the US 
Department of the Treasury – thus adopting ‘recommended’ financial and 
economic measures. The adoption of stabilization packages and structural 
adjustment measures (Washington Consensus) by Colombia and Peru triggered 
policy convergence on economic grounds. On the contrary, the Chilean case 
                                               
57  Nel and Stephen, “The Foreign Economic Policies,” 72. 
58  Both countries have been member states of the AC since 1969. 
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seems to follow its own track. Santiago adopted the neoliberal formula (1973–
1982) during Pinochet´s authoritarian regime – an experiment.59  
Behind the 1980s debt crisis experienced by Colombia, Chile and Peru 
lay not only economic causes (the impossibility to comply with a balance of 
payments problem), but also political factors. It also explains the pro-market 
“Washington Consensus” on development that ruled nearly hegemonically 
during the last decade of the twentieth century.
60
 In fact, these political factors 
are better understood if one considers that foreign economic policy making 
engages different entities in “the political apparatus of a government which 
identifies, decides and implements foreign policy” and they have the ability to 
commit public resources as well as make decisions that cannot be readily 
reversed.
61
 However as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
president may act as the ultimate decision-making unit – administering foreign 
relations personally. Herein other governmental entities assume more marginal 
roles. In this case, a presidential foreign policy model is in motion.
62
  
Such a model is shared by Colombia, Chile and Peru. Their negotiating 
teams continue to set IIAs not only to reassure their commitment to 
international investment rules
63
 and even to enlarge the set of trade facilitation 
provisions via FTAs
64
 with common partners (EU, US), but also to build an 
intra-regional set of rules deeper than those of an ordinary FTA model. In the 
Latin American case, a cognitive explanation that takes into account 
worldviews and beliefs is worthy of exploration given that most countries there 
do indeed have presidential systems in place.
65
  
                                               
59  Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Entre el Neoliberalismo y el Crecimiento con Equidad: Tres 
Décadas de Política Económica en Chile (Santiago de Chile: J. C. Sáez, 2003). In that 
sense, the Chileans experienced radical liberalization. Barbara Geddes, “The Politics of 
Economic Liberalization,” in Latin American Research 30, no. 2 (1995): 195–214. 
60  Miguel A. Centeno, Atul Kohli, and Deborah Yashar, “Unpacking States in the 
Developing World: Capacity, Performance, and Politics,” in States in the Developing 
World, ed. Miguel Angel Centeno, Atul Kohli, and Deborah J Yashar (Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1-34. 
61  Margaret Hermann, Charles Hermann and Joe Hagan, “How Decision Units Shape 
Foreign Policy Behavior,” in New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, ed. Charles 
Hermann, Charles Kegley and James N. Rosenau (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987). 
62  Arlene B. Tickner, Oscar Pardo, and Diego Beltrán, ¿Qué Diplomacia Necesita 
Colombia?: Situación, Diagnóstico y Perspectivas de la Carrera Diplomática y el 
Servicio Exterior (Bogotá: Universidad de Los Andes-CESO, 2006). 
63  Angélica Guerra-Barón, “¿Gobernanza Multinivel o Intergubernamentalismo en 
Inversión?” in Suramérica en el Escenario Global: Gobernanza Multinivel y 
Birregionalismo, ed. Eduardo Pastrana and Hubert Gehring (Bogotá: Editorial Javeriana, 
2014), 327–65. 
64  ECLAC, Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy. The regional trade 
crisis: assessment and outlook (Santiago: United Nations, 2015), accesed at March 13, 
2019, http://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/39011/4/S1501141_en.pdf. 
65  Gardini and Lambert, “Introduction: Ideology and Pragmatism,” 1. 
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Yet one striking difference might become apparent on this issue. While 
the Colombian and Peruvian foreign policies seem to be unquestionably aligned 
with that of the US, wherein Bogota is an extreme case, Chilean foreign policy 
during the democratic governments known as “La Concertación” (mainly 
centre-left coalitions) was strategically market oriented. For example, Chile-US 
trade relations aimed to create a large FTA (from Alaska to Tierra de Fuego), 
Santiago promoted ALCA’s initiative and tried to become a NAFTA member. 
Despite neither ALCA nor NAFTA succeeded, Chile negotiated an FTA with 
Canada and Mexico. Surprisingly, some argue that since the presidency of 
Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994), “democratic internationalism” language was 
designed with the clear goal of reducing foreign policy dependence on the US.
66
  
Diversification of the Chilean FEP was President Eduardo Frei’s 
initiative (1994-2000). Instead, political and trade relations were formally 
intensified with Asia, by becoming an APEC economy (1994), and a less distant 
relation with the sub-region, by reaching an agreement with Mercosur. 
Meanwhile, NAFTA’s invitation to Chile to become a member was impossible 
to concrete. 
This gives a particular character to the Chilean international approach, in 
economic terms – and particularly with the Asian countries. Peruvians followed 
the Chilean example and engaged in pro-Asian relations in the nineties. Instead, 
the Colombian presidencies played back and forth with US alienation (respice 
polum) and US attempt of detachment by interacting more with the neighbours 
(respice similia).  
 
 
Comparing internationalization strategies  
 
Foreign policy elites of Chile, Colombia and Peru shared a collective 
vision when they met at the Andean Group back in the sixties; while the PA 
currently represents leaders’ acknowledgement of policy convergence and like-
mindedness as a platform to partake as a group with Asia-Pacific. 
In the first case, that of Colombia. While Colombian strategies to 
diversify the national economy began in the twentieth century, special emphasis 
being placed on FDI promotion through domestic changes and trade and 
investment negotiations is only a recent development.
67
 The Colombian foreign 
policy of the twenty-first century transformed the country away from an isolated 
                                               
66  Joaquín Fermandois, “Pragmatism, Ideology, and Tradition in Chilean Foreign Policy 
Since 1990,” in Latin American Foreign Policies: Between Ideology and Pragmatism, ed. 
Gian Luca Gardini and Peter Lambert (New York: Palgrave, 2011), 35–52. 
67  Angélica Guerra-Barón and Álvaro Méndez, “A Comparative Study of Foreign Economic 
Policies: The CIVETS Countries,” in LSE-GSU Working Paper Series 3: London, 2015, 
1-23. 
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era (1980s and 1990s) to a more interconnected one, through IIAs negotiations
68
 
in charge of technocrat institutions.
69
  
During Alvaro Uribe’s regime (2002–2010), Bogota’s economic 
strategies remained aligned with the US’ “(a demarche known in Classical times 
as respice polum: look to the metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in 
today’s world, metaphorically, the North]).”70 Thus, Colombian foreign policy 
turned even more presidential and focused on attracting FDI through the 
negotiation of FTAs, a Multi-Parties Agreement with the EU and many BITs
71
  
– herein the relationship with the US was a national priority.  
President Uribe’s foreign policy implemented along with domestic measures 
that included the signing of legal stability contracts and strong reforms to the 
investment climate so as to make Colombia more competitive. Ironically, this was a 
conservative approach compared with that of Peru and Chile. 
It has rather been under the presidency of Juan Manuel Santos (2010–
2018) that strategic pillars were built more coherently. Trained as an economist 
and enterprise manager, with post-graduate studies completed in English and 
American universities, as well as being the grandson of former President 
Eduardo Santos (1938–1942), J. M. Santos has not only inherited Uribe’s trade 
negotiating agenda but also knew how to beneficially exploit the image of 
Colombia as an emerging economy.  
President Santos was convinced of the necessity to implement the FTA 
negotiated with the US and so he managed to get a green light from that 
country’s Congress for it, while the agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA)
72
 also came provisionally into effect. Colombian economic 
performance under President Santos surpassed the levels of previous decades of 
economic growth, reaching 4.8 per cent on average (3.5% in the 1980s; 2.8% in 
the 1990s; 4.0% in the twenty-first century), the highest rates of investment 
(30% GDP) and a low inflation rate (1.94%).  
The Colombian foreign policy model looks forward to a more dynamic 
participation in the WTO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
                                               
68  In fact, many of Colombia’s FTAs and BITs (with China and Japan) were negotiated in 
the early twenty-first century, and a Multi-Party Agreement (MPA) and SP were signed 
with the EU.  
69  The leading entity in trade and investment negotiations is the Ministry of Trade, Industry 
and Tourism (MCIT in Spanish), while other agencies (viz. foreign affairs and finance) 
have only secondary roles. MCIT, along with a public body in charge of promoting FDI 
inflows and outflows (Proexport, currently named PROCOLOMBIA), articulates a 
public–private dialogue.  Congreso de la República de Colombia, Ley 7 de 1991, 
“Normas generales para regular el comercio exterior,” January 6, 1991, accesed May 9, 
2019, http://www.procolombia.co/sites/default/files/ley_0007_1991.pdf.  
70  Guerra-Barón and Méndez, “A Comparative Study of Foreign Economic Policies,” 8.  
71  Ibid. 
72  Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 
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Development (OECD), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the 
Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO). The government equally shows a clear interest in 
becoming an OECD economy, achieved in 2018, increasing trade and services 
with its traditional political partners, such as the US and the EU, with its more 
recent partners of the Pacific Alliance
73
 and in managing to and strengthening 
Colombian participation in global value chains. However, Colombia is still 
waiting to be accepted into APEC. 
A more territorial understanding of Colombia’s performance shapes the 
country’s presidency. In that sense, both punctual and transversal strategies 
have already shown themselves to have at heart the aim of being executed at a 
sub-national level – such as in the Colombian Pacific Region. Despite its 
richness, that zone is locally known for its low environmental development
74
 
and the country’s high social inequalities, its low institutional capacity and its 
middling to high insecurity levels brought about by the armed conflict.  
President Santos’ view of the Pacific is that of a high-potential zone, 
wherein market sustainability should be tackled from a multi-dimensional 
perspective. This is due to the fact that the Colombian government looks 
forward to incrementing connectivity throughout the Pacific Region, so as to 
transform it into both a platform of trade within the territory and of exchange 
with Asia. Thus, President Santos aims to empower the region vis-à-vis trade, 
transforming it into a geo-strategic hub wherein Asia becomes Colombia’s new 
“East Pole”.75  
In the second case, that of Peru, despite the complex scenario left behind 
by Alan Garcia after his first presidency (1985-1990)
76
 Peru still secured 
membership of the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) and of the Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) in 1991. 
Peru becoming an APEC economy (1998) brought with it an adjustment 
period to the organization’s principles, especially for the productive sector, as 
                                               
73  Departamento de Planeación Nacional. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2014–2018: Todos 
por un Nuevo País (Bogotá: Carmen Villamizar and Carmen Forero, 2015), accesed May 
7, 2019, https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/PND/PND%202014-2018%20Tomo% 
201@20internet.pdf. 
74  Departamento de Planeación Nacional. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2014–2018: Todos 
por un Nuevo País Segundo Volumen (Bogotá: Carmen Villamizar and Carmen Forero, 
2015), accesed at May 7, 2019, second volume, https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/ 
CDT/PND/PND%202014-2018%20Tomo%202%20internet.pdf.  
75  It means that Colombian decision makers promote a narrower political relation with Asia, 
rather than solely with the USA.  
76  The Alan García presidency (1985–1990) brought about a number of negative 
consequences – such as its default in 1990 (US$ 20,000 million) with social outcomes: 
low salaries, diminishing of social expenditure and higher poverty rates (43.1% in 1985 
up to 53.6% in 1991). 
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well as a way to share with other APEC countries. Fujimori's idea to transform 
Peru into a bridge country between South America and Asia-Oceania was 
prominent. Therefore the Peruvian elite designed a trade-driven strategy to 
enhance trans-Pacific interactions.
77
 Fujimori's economic ideas were adopted by 
his successor Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006), who dealt with the economic 
challenges ensuing from membership in APEC and Borgor’s goal to become a 
more liberalised economy on trade and investment issues by 2020.
78
  
Having in mind Peru’s image as a bridge country,79 most governmental 
efforts at the time focused on the diversification of international relations. For 
example, during the 1990s Peru thus entered into a race of negotiating BITs 
with Asia-Pacific key partners (China, Japan, Malaysia and Thailand).
80
 The 
trend towards FTA negotiations with Asian countries (China, Japan, Singapore 
and South Korea) came to light during Alan Garcia’s second administration.81 
In a nutshell, it is clear how Fujimori’s economic ideas irradiated Peruvian FEP 
in the long term – leading to an aggressive negotiating agenda of IIAs, one 
much more active than the Colombian approach was. 
Furthermore, Lima’s decision to enact its role as a South American key 
“trade player” with Asia was politically and economically executed in stages. 
First, by re-positioning itself as an Asian South American bridge. Second, by 
abandoning its image of a development assistance recipient country in order to 
adopt that of a trade partner.
82
 However, some state that the active participation 
of Peru in the twenty-first century global setting is an outcome specifically of 
the FTA negotiations carried out with the US.
83
 
When Alan Garcia came to power for a second time (2006–2011), Lima’s 
foreign policy was conducted via FTAs (Canada, South Korea, Costa Rica, Chile, 
China, Singapore, EFTA countries) and BITs (Belgium and Luxembourg). Garcia’s 
                                               
77  Fernando González, “Relaciones de Comercio e Inversión del Perú con el Asia-Pacífico,” 
in Veinte Años de Política Exterior Peruana (1991-2011), ed. IDEI (Lima: Fondo 
Editorial PUCP), 209–41.  
78  Robert Scollay and Fernando González-Vigil, “Los Acuerdos Comerciales en El Asia-
Pacífico de Cara a los Objetivos de APEC,” in Revista de Estudios Internacionales 36, no. 
144 (2004): 7–29. 
79  Alejandro Toledo, Plan de Gobierno 2011-2016: más y mejor educación (Lima: Presidencia de 
la República, 2011), accesed at May 7, 2019, http://www.archivoelectoral.org/ 
documentos/plan-de-gobierno/285. 
80  More than 95% of all BITs had already been signed prior to 1998 (China: 1995, Malaysia: 
1995, Thailand: 1991), while its FTAs negotiating campaign came to light only in the 
twenty-first century. 
81  Guerra-Barón, “¿Gobernanza Multinivel o Intergubernamentalismo en Inversión?,” 327. 
82  Such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), GSP plus (GSP+), the Andean 
Trade Preference Act (ATPA) and the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act 
(ATPDEA). 
83  Philip I. Levy, “Free Trade Foreign Policy: How Trade Myths Impede a Key US Policy 
Tool,” in Harvard International Review 33, no. 3 (2011).  
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initiative of creating a group of Latin American countries geo-strategically located 
in the Pacific Region that share economic and political perspectives perhaps 
represents the peak of his political career. Garcia’s leading role in breathing life into 
the PA idea ended once his successor came to office. President Ollanta Humala 
(2011–2016) is a career army officer and former President of the Union for Peru 
(UP), co-founder of the Peruvian Nationalist Party and a close ally of Hugo 
Chavez’s socialist project.84 Despite Humala’s background, he aligned with his 
predecessor pro-foreign investors narrative emphasising Peru’s protagonist role as a 
host country in multilateral and sub-regional summits.
85
 Therefore, Humala’s 
ideological affinities did not reflect upon Peru’s  positive economic performance;86 
suggesting that this is a natural output of recent macroeconomic policies previously 
arranged as state policy. 
Recently elected President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, PPK, (2016–2018), 
openly proclaims himself to be a believer in neoliberalism, as a tool to fight 
inequality. The Peruvian leader first worked at the World Bank, the Peruvian 
Central Bank and then for key ministries (Energy and Mines in the 1980s, and 
Economy and Finance from 2001–2002 and 2004 to 2005). PPK held bilateral 
meetings with key IFIs such the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and 
the Development Bank of Latin America (DBLA), as well as with Chilean and 
Peruvian entrepreneurs. In order to strengthen political dialogue and to identify 
key sources of investment in infrastructure, PPK made China its first official 
international visit as president; meanwhile in the Peruvian bilateral agenda an 
FTA with Australia, India and Indonesia is also on its way. As expected, PPK’s 
impeachment did not interfere with the Peruvian foreign economic policy as 
according to its ministry of trade. PPK had to resign (March 23, 2018) due to 
his involvement in the Odebrecht (a Brazilian construction company) scandal 
for the paying of bribes to prominent South American officials.  
In what concerns the third case, that of Chile, after the coup d’état of the 
11
th
 of September 1973, the dictatorship of Pinochet (1973–1989) turned the 
                                               
84  Jorge Castañeda, “Latin America’s Left Turn,” in Foreign Affairs, no. May-June (2006). 
See also: Robert, Kaufman, “Political Economy and the New Left” in Democratic 
Governance in Latin America, ed. Cynthia Arnson and Raúl Perales (Washington: 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2007). In this sense, see: Hector E. 
Schamis, “A ‘Left Turn’ in Latin America?,” in Journal of Democracy 17, no. 4 (2006): 
20–34. 
85  “Message to the Nation given by President Humala to Congress on 28 July 2015,” 
accessed May 10, 2017, http://www.educacionenred.pe/noticia/?portada=78062. 
86  Peru will be one of the most dynamic economies in the region by 2021, with an 
accumulated national growth of 55% – being followed by Colombia, Chile and Ecuador. 
CEPlAN, “Perú 2021: País OCDE. Peru 2021: OECD Member Country,” Serie: Avance 
de Investigación, No. 1, 2015, accesed January 1, 2017, http://www.rree.gob.pe/ 
Documents/2017/OCDE_2021.pdf. 
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focus of Chilean foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region.
87
 The Chilean 
way of implementing its trade and foreign policy was carried out by a group of 
technocrats. They achieved concrete short term results,
88
 as well as positive 
outcomes such as closer relations with the IFIs and a welcoming message to 
potential foreign investors.
89
 The democratic governments (1990–2007) not 
only adopted similar responses to other Latin American partners
90
 so as to deal 
in a very constructive way with the IFIs, but also reinforced trade commitments 
such as FTAs and complementary agreements on specific sectors thorough 
complementary economic agreements. 
Pinochet’s rule triggered its policymakers to engage in a strategy vis-à-
vis trade partners, who were indifferent to the country’s political climate. 
Therefore, stronger trade relations were launched with the Asia-Pacific region 
(Japan, ASEAN+4,
91
 China and other NICs).
92
 The Chilean regional isolation 
equally explains their aspiration of becoming a bridge between South America 
and Asia – particularly Japan. The cultivation of that image first emerged with 
the Chilean–Japanese Entrepreneurship Committee (1994) – wherein much of 
the momentum came from the Asian side. Such a strategy was regionally 
acknowledged by South American countries as pragmatic yet effective and 
efficient.
93
  
Once Pinochet's regime came to an end (1990), the Chilean approach was 
bilaterally oriented through different kinds of trade accords as a tool to be 
acknowledged as a liberal democracy in which territory open trade is embraced.  
Regarding Asia-Pacific, the country’s multilateral alignment with key 
partners and Asia-Pacific, particularly with Malaysia, aimed to count on their 
support for Chile’s acceptance as an APEC member – something achieved at 
                                               
87  Japan, the newly industrialized countries (NICs): South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Taiwan; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China. César Ross, 
“Chile y el Asia Pacífico: La Construcción Histórica del Futuro,” in Si Somos 
Americanos, Revista de Estudios Transfronterizos IX, no. 1 (2007): 109–40. See also: 
Raúl Sanhueza and Ángel Soto, “Chile en el Contexto del Pacífico: Marcos Conceptuales 
para la Política Exterior de Chile Hacia el Asia Pacífico,” in Revista UNISCI 21 (2009), 
120-136. 
88  Such as an increase in the GDP per capita (3.3% for 1985–1990) and a significant 
diminishing in the country’s unemployment rate (21.4% to 5.7%). 
89  Fernando F. González, Dual Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Institutionalized 
Regimes in Chile and Mexico, 1970-2000 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2008). 
90  Manfred Wilhelmy and Roberto Durán, “Los Principales Rasgos de la Política Exterior Chilena 
entre 1973 y el 2000,” in Revista de Ciencia Política XXIII, no. 2 (2003): 273–86. 
91  The Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. 
92  Except for Singapore, which established relations with Chile in 1988. Ross, “Chile y el 
Asia Pacífico,” 109. 
93  Ibid. 
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Blake Island in 1993.
94
 Similar to the Peruvian case, Chile committed to comply 
with the Borgor goals (Indonesia, 1994) as part of it being an APEC economy. 
Furthermore, the country’s bilateral approach through IIAs was mostly 
intensified through BITs concluded under the presidencies of Eduardo Frei 
(1994–2000) and Ricardo Lagos Escobar (2000–2006).  
Chilean foreign policy has since been pursued on the basis of an 
aggressive strategy of IIAs negotiations.
95
 It equally confirms the Chilean 
preference of avoiding stronger commitments being made in multilateral South 
American settings as member of any regional scheme.
96
 
The presidency of Michelle Bachelet (2006–2010) openly acknowledged 
Chile’s new political status in the world, and its commitment to building a Latin 
American identity while also cooperating with UNASUR. Furthermore, 
Bachelet’s foreign policy model clearly strove to search for alliances with 
countries with which Chile shares matching goals and policies.
97
 Consequently 
the austral state kept up its internationalization strategy, with its natural 
interlocutors – via IIAs – both within the APEC framework (Australia, China, 
Japan, Peru, P4
98
) and bilaterally (Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, India, 
Nicaragua, Panama). At the end of Bachelet’s term, the latent idea of forging an 
alliance with South American countries that matched Chilean views finally 
reached completion. However, it was in fact her successor who vigorously 
promoted Chile’s engagement with the PA. President Sebastián Piñera, a 
congress man (1990-1998), right-wing businessman and a Chilean billionaire 
with a real time net worth of U$ 2.8 billion according to Forbes List (2019),
99
 
led his country’s foreign policy differently (2010–2014). He continued to 
pursue both multilateral and bilateral trade agendas, while adding two partners 
to the Chilean list of IIAs (Malaysia and Turkey). 
Piñera’s rule was responsible for turning Chilean foreign policy towards 
different dynamics. Chile participated as a founder and full member of an 
economically driven scheme alongside those of its Latin American neighbours 
sharing a border with the Pacific Coast.
100
 As such, it now left behind its 
traditional role of being either only an associated member or just an institutional 
                                               
94  Wilhelmy and Durán, “Los Principales Rasgos,” 273. 
95  Guerra-Barón, “¿Gobernanza Multinivel o Intergubernamentalismo en Inversión?,” 327. 
96  Ibid. 
97  Michelle Bachelet, “Programa de Gobierno,” 2015, accesed May 9, 2019, 
http://www.bibliotecanacionaldigital.gob.cl/bnd/646/w3-article-157782.html. 
98  Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (P4) with Brunei Darussalam, 
New Zealand and Singapore. 
99  Forbes, “The Billionaires List,” May 9, 2019, accessed May 7, 2019, 
https:/www.forbes.com/profile/sebastian-pinera/#4b87962c7a75. 
100  Guerra-Barón, “¿Gobernanza Multinivel o Intergubernamentalismo en Inversión?,” 327. 
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observer.
101
 Despite some analysts arguing that Chilean membership of the PA 
may change during  Bachelet’s second administration (2014–2018), the austral 
country has in fact not only stayed in it but also promoted policy and regulatory 
convergence between the PA and Mercosur.
102
 So far, Bachelet’s goal of using 
the PA as a trade platform to interact collectively with Asia
103
 continues – while 
bilaterally Chile was recently invited to sign the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation with ASEAN (August 2016) and to negotiate an FTA with 
Australia (2017). 
Piñera’s second administration (2018–2022) in Chile is not expected to 
include substantial changes neither regarding its relations with Asia nor with the 
PA as Piñera was key promoter of the scheme back in 2010. 
 
 
Capitalizing Unilateral Approaches and Outcomes 
 
In 2011, President Santos and Piñera meet with Garcia at the Palacio de 
Gobierno in Lima to make public a presidential project known as the PA. This 
“novel regionalist scheme” orients towards motivating “deeper trade and 
investment relations with Asia through intergovernmental understanding” – 
while avoiding any sort of supranationality” “or a similar requirement that 
implies giving up sovereignty.”104 This meeting is the PA cornerstone (A. P. 
Alianza del Pacífico 2011) on which all normative and institutional architecture 
of the regionalism scheme is based on. In 2012,
105
 the group emerged formally 
through a presidential declaration that recalls economic and political like-
                                               
101  In the South American context, Chile is a member state of UNASUR since its inception 
until 2019. It is also an associate member of the AC. Comunidad Andina, Gaceta Oficial 
Año XXIII - Número 1401, Decisión 645, "Otorgamiento de la condición de País 
Miembro de la Comunidad Andina a la República de Chile,” September 21, 2006, 
http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Docum entos/Gacetas/Gace1401.pdf. Furthermore, 
Chile reached a partial economic agreement with Mercosur (1996). DIRECON, “ACE No. 
35 Mercosur-Chile,” December 6, 1996, https://www.direcon.gob.cl/2017/06/acuerdo-de-
complementacion-economica-chile-mercosur-2/.  
102  Gilberto Aranda and Jorge Riquelme, “¿Es Posible la Convergencia en la Diversidad?: 
Chile entre la Alianza del Pacífico y el Mercosur,” in Revista de Relaciones 
Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad 10, no. 2 (2015): 155–78. See also: Foxley, 
Alejandro, “Nuevo Desafío para América Latina: Integración Productiva,” in Alianza del 
Pacífico: En el Proceso de Integración Latinoamericana, ed. Alejandro Foxley and 
Patricio Meller (Santiago de Chile: Uqbar Editores, 2014), 13–26. 
103  Bachelet, “Programa de Gobierno,” 2015, 154. 
104  Angélica Guerra-Barón, “China and South America: The Pacific Alliance,” in Impakter, 
November 8, 2018, accesed May 8, 2019, https://impakter.com/china-and-south-america-
the-pacific-alliance/. 
105  Pacific Alliance Framework Agreement. Alianza del Pacífico, AP. Acuerdo Marco de la 
Alianza del Pacífico. Declaración de Lima (Antofagasta, Chile, 2012). 
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mindedness that Colombia, Chile and Peru already share (along with Mexico), 
such as their international core values (respect for democracy and international 
law), and their prior engagement with common trade partners by virtue of a 
network of IIAs as well as their need to have closer and deeper relations, 
primarily but not exclusively, with Asia.
106
  
The PA aims to take advantage of FEP and strategies convergence 
through three main objectives. First, to create an undefined ‘deep integration 
area’ (DIA), a sort of free trade zone area that includes not only free movement 
of capitals, goods and services but also the free movement of people. Second, to 
engage collectively in a platform to facilitate policy and regulatory convergence 
and to project a particular image to relevant outsiders (Asia-Pacific). In spite of 
the lack of definition regarding a DIA, it can be inferred that liberalization of all 
factors of production is what the presidents aimed to do; without making any 
reference to create a common market though. Finally, a long-term objective 
refers to overcoming socio-economic disparity and reaching social inclusion 
through economic growth, development and competitiveness (article 3). 
Undoubtedly structural and historic analysis of Chile, Colombia and Peru 
suggests the existence of policy convergence on internationalization issues 
through investment strategies at both bilateral and multilateral levels. It does not 
mean that the PA was presidentially announced (2011) with the aim of creating 
exclusively a foreign investment promotion platform, but it supports the fact 
that these countries have previously met at the Latin American Pacific Basin 
Forum (2007-2010), to take advantage of IIAs convergence. This previous 
encounter is key in the formation of the PA – not exclusive though. Thus, this is 
one of the pillars over which the PA builds itself and the one that works as a 
standing point to further agreements on trade disciplines through different 
means. 
As a unit, the Pacific Alliance members facilitate coordination
107
 and 
cooperation,
108
 on an intergovernmental basis mainly, but using policy 
convergence as a platform. Policy convergence over investment strategies 
between Chile and Peru particularly, and Colombia to a lesser extent, did indeed 
                                               
106  Guerra-Barón, “China and South America.” 
107  It consists of all the adjustments, such as discussion about the adverse consequences of 
any decisions taken, and then their effects for other subsequent decisions Charles 
Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making Through Mutual Adjustment 
(New York: The Free Press, 1965). These decisions need to be made by actors (whether 
individuals or organizations) in order that their actions are brought into conformity with 
each other, achieved through a process of negotiation. Robert O. Keohane, After 
Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
108  Cooperation “occurs when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated 
preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination.” Ibid., 51. Keohane, 
“After Hegemony,” 51.  
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trigger coordination. After, a cooperative inter-governmental scheme to act 
collaboratively in relation to Asia and its markets emerged – that without either 
having a common foreign policy or creating an international organization to 
support this approach. Such a transnational convergence of policies on 
economic matters is facilitated by domestic drivers. The Chilean image of being 
a Pacific country respectful of international (economic) norms is a never-ending 
process, wherein the main strategy is strengthening its diplomatic network and 
its IIAs map. This strategy has been carried out despite the different political 
stances of the country’s various leaders, the right wing for Piñera, and centre-
left for Bachelet.  
The Colombian elite of the twenty-first century has insisted on detaching 
domestic issues from the role that Colombia might play in the international 
arena. Such a strategy has been presidentially driven and has consisted mainly 
of structuring a legal and economic framework that includes improving the 
country’s investment climate while playing an active role in concluding IIAs. 
However, Colombia has not performed as well as its South American PA 
partners have in terms of its presence in Asia, while its role as a Pacific territory 
is currently only at an early stage of development.  
On the contrary, Peru entered into the global economy after a precarious 
and critical period in the 1980s. It pushed the Peruvian elite to diversify 
political and economic partners and to engage with Asia. Similar to the Chilean 
experience, Peru created and nourished a network of IIAs with Asian 
interlocutors; meanwhile, it is also currently working on a strategy to transform 
the territory into a hub geo-strategically situated at the geographical heart of 
South America. As such the policy convergence of Bogota, Lima and Santiago 
on FEP, and particularly on negotiating and internationalization strategies, 
becomes a platform through which to increase cooperation among and between 
both member states and key observer states.  
In this particular sense I argue that the PA sets an example of policy 
convergence as an output to further understandings with insiders and with 
relevant outsiders – such as Asia-Pacific partners.  
After explaining the PA’s objective in forming a relationship with the 
Asia-Pacific region and the possibility of inter-governmental cooperation being 
achieved through this institutional body, it is a fact that Bogota, Lima and 
Santiago have indeed agreed to take advantage of their like-mindedness and 
policy convergence on economic issues so as to act as a bloc vis-à-vis Asia -
mainly but not exclusively.  
This does not hide the fact that these countries’ interests overlap 
specifically for economic reasons but not oppose. For example, Chile and Peru 
are China’s main recipients of FDI flows in the primary sector, while both also 
have FTAs with the Chinese. Even though none of the Latin American countries 
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are either China’s main exporter partners109 or importers,110 the Asian economy 
needs from them raw materials for its domestic production (crude oil: 14%; 
iron: 5.3%; gold: 3.6%). Peru has received the greatest amount of Chinese 
investment to this end, particularly in the mining and energy sector.
111
 In a 
nutshell production and export concentrates in low-productivity sectors without 
technological dynamism.
112
 
Without any doubt an inter-governmental cooperation scheme such as the 
PA might be strongly led by its South American members, yet the dependency 
on the Chinese demand for raw materials must be tackled using the same means 
that fostered the alliance’s creation in the first place.113 A public–private 
strategic partnership that promotes non-traditional exports based on services and 
technologically added value should be politically addressed, economically 
designed (on domestic and sub-regional grounds and with key stakeholders) and 
strategically coordinated between the various insiders.
114
  
 
 
Preliminary Insights 
 
International political economy offers theoretical tools of value to 
international law and economics scholars engaged in explaining policy 
convergence. International political economy allows variables that have 
traditionally been omitted to be introduced, such as the dynamics unleashed by 
political and economic factors and the relationship between a leader’s own 
economic ideas and the devising of regionalism schemes – as Odell and 
Ravenhill suggest. International political economy theoretical richness allows us 
to verify how non-legal elements have been successfully networked into a 
particular moment of policy. While the Chilean case might be catalogued as an 
experiment in South America, in the sense that the country was a pioneer in its 
                                               
109  US (19%), Hong Kong (11%), Japan (8.3%), Germany (4.4%) and South Korea (3.7%). 
ECLAC, Latin America and the Caribbean. 
110  Japan (10%), South Korea (9.3%), other Asian countries (8.1%), US (8%) and Germany 
(6%). Ibid. 
111  Amos Irwin and Kevin P. Gallagher, “Chinese Mining in Latin America: A Comparative 
Perspective,” in The Journal of Environment & Development 22, no. 2 (2013): 207–34.  
112  ECLAC, Latin America and the Caribbean. 
113  According to the latest World Investment Report, China has a huge presence in South 
America mainly through greenfield investment in cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A sales). Despite the lack of an FTA between China and Brazil, there was a $7 
billion rise of Chinese investment in 2017 ($9 billion) compared to 2015 ($2 billion), 
boosted by megadeals involving China Three Gorges Corporation. Guerra-Barón, “China 
and South America.” 
114  In fact, the Entrepreneurship Council of the PA (EC-PA) was created in 2012 as the result 
of a private initiative.  
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enacting of the neoliberal formula, Colombia and Peru also followed that trend 
in the years after the 1980s debt crisis. These three countries carried out 
domestic changes so as to improve their investment climate and also developed 
active unilateral, bilateral and multilateral agendas in a sub-regional setting in 
order to behave as competitive trade partners.  
Policy convergence over internationalization and negotiating strategies as 
experienced by Chile, Colombia and Peru was a milestone factor in the creation 
of the PA itself. Equally, such policy convergence has allowed these countries 
to reach innovative and advanced agreements on a number of trade 
(accumulation of origin) and non-trade (shared commercial and trade offices, 
diplomatic representation) issues. In this case, policy convergence represents an 
outcome of policy coordination and cooperation.  
One of the elements transversally presented in the Chilean, Colombian 
and Peruvian policies (particularly on economic issues) refers to historical 
junctures and the active role that presidencies play in planning and 
implementation. This reality generates the possibility that the economic ideas of 
the key decision makers influence the creation and consolidation of inter-
governmental cooperative schemes, such as the PA. This is a politically and 
economically driven scheme whose short-term outcomes are indeed 
presidentially promoted. After, common interests play a role – along with the 
economic ideas shared by the different leaders, being well established in their 
trade protocols.
115
 Interests as well as economic ideas converge through inter-
governmental mechanisms of understanding, being led by a high-level group 
(vice ministers) and by technical ones too.
116
 
The major challenge for the South American PA states now consists of 
ensuring the various leaders’ commitment to long-term cooperative mechanisms 
over short-term results. Colombia, Chile and Peru are acknowledged as 
emerging economies and promissory investment miracles; thus, government 
efforts should lead to a timely strategy within the Technical Group of External 
Relations (TGER) towards the Asia-Pacific region, and particularly China. 
Eventually, as part of that strategy, the PA may become a host investment block 
in the domains of service industries, technology, information and innovation. 
A potential issue may arise between the PA members due to their 
competition over attracting FDI flows. However, affiliation with the PA does 
not impede its member states from developing their own individual mechanisms 
and domestic strategies. As such, the PA’s institutional architecture not only 
allows for but also in fact facilitates agents collaborating with outsiders. 
                                               
115  Alianza del Pacífico (AP), “Protocolo Adicional al Acuerdo Marco de la Alianza del 
Pacífico,” February, 10, 2014, http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/PAC_ALL/PROTOCOLO_ 
COMPLETO.pdf.  
116  Consistent with such a setting, all PA states (including Chile) have been engaged in a race 
to attract FDI into their territories – as most emergent economies have.  
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Furthermore, these countries’ elites prefer policy coordination and inter-
governmental cooperation to rigid institutional architecture. Yet it should be 
first acknowledged that both Chile and Peru share a pro-Pacific profile in 
economic and political terms, while Colombia’s elites have traditionally ignored 
the Pacific Coast as a key sub-region within the country. Consequently, its 
sudden importance to Colombia refers very specifically to the existence of the 
PA itself. The PA thus offers a good example not only of the role that norms 
played in the creation of the group itself, but also the impact that policy 
convergence has on a longer-term basis.  
 
